Showing posts with label Role of Councilors Inspectors and Social Workers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Role of Councilors Inspectors and Social Workers. Show all posts

Botswana (2007), Court of Appeal

Botswana (2007), Court of Appeal

Sekoto v. Director of Public Prosecutions
(CLCB -037-06) [2007] BWCH 12 (25 January 2007)


The appellant appealed his conviction for the murder of his live-in girlfriend and his sentence of 12 years imprisonment. The Court upheld the sentence, noting the increasing incidence in Botswana of former lovers killing their partners and affirming that the courts should impose appropriately stiff sentences as a deterrent.


“The growing phenomenon of jilted lovers killing their partners is fast becoming a nightmare in this country…the point that the courts must play their part in stamping out this phenomenon… cannot be stressed strongly enough. The deceased was brutally murdered simply because she sought to exercise her right to terminate her relationship with the appellant and because she sought to exercise her choice of finding a new lover.” (Quoted form Original Judgment)

Turkey (2009), European Court of Human Rights


Turkey (2009), European Court of Human Rights

Opuz v. Turkey
Application no. 33401/02




The applicant argued that Turkish authorities failed to protect her and her mother from domestic violence, which ultimately resulted in the death of the latter. The ECHR held that Turkey violated Articles 2, 3, 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and ordered the state to pay the victim non-pecuniary damages and costs.


“The applicant has been able to show… that the domestic violence affected mainly women and that the general and discriminatory judicial passivity in Turkey created a climate that was conducive to domestic violence…the State's failure to protect women against domestic violence breaches their right to equal protection of the law.” (Quoted form Original Judgment)




United States (2005), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights


United States (2005), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

Jessica Gonzales et al. v. United States of America

Case 1490-05, Report No. 52/07, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ Ser.L/ V/II.130 Doc. 22, rev. 1 (2007)



Jessica Gonzales' three children were killed when local police failed to enforced a restraining order against her estranged husband. The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that no affirmative duty exists on the part of the government to enforce a protective order. In a bold move, she took the case to the IACHR which returned an admissibility decision and affirmed her assertion that she had exhausted all domestic avenues in her search for justice.


“The Commission concludes that it has the competence to examine the Petitioners’ allegations and that the petition is admissible for the alleged violation of Articles I, II, V, VI, VII, XVIII, and XXIV of the American Declaration and in the accordance with the Commission’s Rule of Procedure.”(Quoted form Original Judgment)




United Kingdom (2006), High Court of England and Wales

United Kingdom (2006), High Court of England and Wales

Reading Borough Council v. D & Ors
EWHC 1465 Fam




The judgment draws a distinction between information and documents, allowing the police to use the information gathered from disclosure in their criminal investigation, but requiring court permission to use the documents.


“Part of the protection of children and an officer's role in a child protection unit covers the removal of a child from danger. It may also include seeking appropriate bail conditions to ensure that a child does not come into contact with someone charged with an offence whom there is reasonable cause to believe may harm the child… I am satisfied therefore that DC Johnson can use the information but not the documents disclosed to him for both child protection and criminal investigation purposes. However to use the documents he had to seek the court's permission. As I have stated, I readily give that permission.”(Quoted form Original Judgment)





Hungary (2003), CEDAW

Hungary (2003), CEDAW

A.T. v. Hungary
CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003




The appellant was subject to domestic violence and serious threats at the hands of her common law husband for four years. In this case, she sought justice and fair compensation for her suffering. Moreover, she claimed that the State party violated both the letter and spirit of CEDAW. The Committee found that the State party violated Articles 2, 5, and 16 of the Convention.


“The State party has admitted that the remedies pursued by the author, were not capable of providing immediate protection to her against ill-treatment by her former partner and, furthermore, that legal and institutional arrangements in the State party are not yet ready to ensure the internationally expected, coordinated, comprehensive and effective protection and support for the victims of domestic violence.” (Quoted form Original Judgment)






Brazil (2000), Inter-America Commission on Human Rights

Brazil (2000), Inter-America Commission on Human Rights

Maria da Penha v. Brazil
Case 12.051, Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111 Doc. 20 rev. at 704 (2000)




This case was a landmark decision in terms of the IACHR hearing an individual complaint of human rights violations. The Court concluded that Brazil had violated the appellant’s right to a fair trial and judicial protection. The Court recommended prompt compensation for the victim, and the adoption of measures at the national level to eliminate tolerance by the state of domestic violence against women.



“A general pattern of negligence and lack of effective action by the State in prosecuting and convicting aggressors... creates a climate that is conducive to domestic violence, since society sees no evidence of willingness by the State, as the representative of the society, to take effective action to sanction such acts… The Federative Republic of Brazil is responsible for violation of the right to a fair trial and judicial protection, guaranteed in Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention.” (Quoted form Original Judgment)

United States (2000), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit


United States (2000), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Estate of Maria Teresa Macias v. Mark Ihde
219 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2000)




After the death of Mrs. Macias at the hands of her abusive husband, her family filed a case alleging that her constitution rights had been violated. This initial claim was dismissed after the Court found that murder was not a "constitutional deprivation". The Court of Appeals reversed this judgment, on the grounds that the violation of equal protection was the constitutional deprivation, not murder.


“The alleged constitutional deprivation in this matter was the alleged denial of equal police protection to Mrs. Macias… The district court erred in concluding that the alleged constitutional deprivation was the murder of Mrs. Macias. The district court also erred in dismissing the action without determining whether the Appellees' conduct deprived Mrs. Macias of her right to equal protection.” (Quoted form Original Judgment)

Canada (1999), Supreme Court

Canada (1999), Supreme Court

R. v. Godoy
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 311




Police officers responded to a call made from the defendant’s home, whereupon they forced their way into the premises and arrested the defendant who had been beating his wife. Initially, it was held that the arrest was illegal, since the officer’s presence on the private property was unauthorized. However, the Supreme Court held that the duty of the police to respond to emergency calls justified such an intrusion.


“The police duty to protect life is engaged whenever it can be inferred that the 911 caller is or may be in some distress, including cases where the call is disconnected before the nature of the emergency can be determined. The importance of the police duty to protect life warrants and justifies a forced entry into a dwelling in order to ascertain the health and safety of a 911 caller. This interference is authorized at common law as it falls within the scope of the police duty to protect life and safety.” (Quoted form Original Judgment)

United States (1984), Connecticut District Court


United States (1984), Connecticut District Court

Thurman v. City of Torrington
(595 F. Supp. 1521 D. Conn. 1984)




The plaintiff sued the city, arguing that the police department had violated her constitutional right to equal protection under the law. She claimed that officers failed to enforce her estranged husband's probation orders, and ignored his assaults against her. The jury awarded her significant damages, and following the case, many police departments strengthened their policies on responding to domestic violence.


“If officials have notice of the possibility of attacks on women in domestic relationships or other persons, they are under an affirmative duty to take reasonable measures to protect the personal safety of such persons in the community. [A] police officer may not knowingly refrain from interference in such violence... Such inaction on the part of the officer is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.” (Quoted form Original Judgment)

Ireland (1979), European Court of Human Rights


Ireland (1979), European Court of Human Rights

Airey v. Ireland
Application no. 6289/73




The plaintiff sought to dissolve her marriage because of her husband’s alleged physical and mental cruelty to her and their children. However, due to the prohibitively high costs of seeking a judicial separation order, she was unable to find a solicitor willing to act on her behalf. The Court found that Ireland had breached Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), namely the ‘right to access courts’ and ‘respect for family life’.

“The Court does not consider that Ireland can be said to have ‘interfered’ with Mrs. Aireys’s private or family life: the substance of her complaint is not that the State has acted but that it has failed to act... not having been put in a position in which she could apply to the High Court... she was unable to seek recognition in law of her de facto separation from her husband. She has therefore been the victim of a violation of Article 8.” (Quoted form Original Judgment)